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THE UNBALANCED IMAGERY OF
ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY
Stuart Macdonald*
Balancing the competing demands of security and liberty is com-
monly said to be the central task of anti-terrorism policy. This Essay
begins by distinguishing between the two ways in which the notion of
balance is presented-the trade-off thesis and the image of a set of
scales-and argues that each is flawed as an analytical aid. The Essay
then proceeds to show further limitations of the balancing discourse, not-
ing how it excludes any scope for consideration of issues relating to re-
source allocation and the effects of a particular measure on security and
liberty. Additionally, this balancing discourse focuses on only one strat-
egy for responding to terrorism. The Essay concludes by warning
against the use of imagery in complex debates and by asserting that bal-
ancing security and liberty is not the sole, or even the central, task of
anti-terrorism policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary debates about anti-terrorism policy commonly pre-
sent security and liberty as competing values. Balancing the demands of
these values is said to be the central task facing policy-makers. Such
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thinking holds sway on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States,
the final report of the 9/11 Commission warned that "while protecting
our homeland, Americans should be mindful of threats to vital personal
and civil liberties. This balancing is no easy task, but we must constantly
strive to keep it right."' In the United Kingdom, the Government's re-
view of the criminal justice system in 2006 stressed the need for the
system to keep pace with new challenges-including the threat of inter-
national terrorism-and concluded that the existing system was deficient
because it was imbalanced in favor of liberty. 2
A number of critiques of this balancing discourse are already in ex-
istence. For example, critics have suggested that the binary opposition of
security and liberty obscures their complex relationship. A number of
commentators have stressed that these values are mutually interdepen-
dent, with some urging that security is a necessary prerequisite for liberty
and others claiming that the erosion of civil liberty safeguards will jeop-
ardize our security against the state. 3 Others have even suggested that
the dichotomization of security and liberty threatens to undermine the
very concept of human rights. 4 The balancing discourse has also been
criticized for obscuring the distribution of proposed changes in security
and liberty. In practice, the diminutions in liberty imposed by anti-ter-
rorism provisions will affect only a small proportion of the population.
This reality, coupled with the fact that these individuals are likely to be
from ethnic minorities and thought of as presumptive offenders, means
that it is important to consider the communal interest in the protection of
civil liberties against the demands of security.5 Furthermore, commenta-
1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS
UPON THE UNITED STATES 394 (2004).
2 See HOME OFFICE, REBALANCING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN FAVOUR OF THE
LAW-ABIDING MAJoRITY: CUTTING CRIME, REDUCING REOFFENDING AND PROTECTING THE
PUBLIC 12 (2006), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/CJS-review.pdf (then follow
"CJS Review - English) ("Only by continuing to look at the whole system together will we be
able to rebalance the criminal justice system in favour of the law-abiding majority.").
3 See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of the Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 155 (2002); Viet D. Dinh, Foreword: Freedom
and Security after September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 399, 406 (2002); Tamar Mei-
sels, How Terrorism Upsets Liberty, 53 POL. STUD. 162, 162-65 (2005); Jeremy Waldron
Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance, I I J. POL. PHIL. 191 (2003).
4 See generally Conor Gearty, Terrorism and Human Rights, 42 GOV'T & OPPOSITION
340 (2007) (discussing the impact of terrorism on human rights); Gerd Oberleitner, Porcupines
in Love: The Intricate Convergence of Human Rights and Human Security, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 588 (2005) (examining the interplay between the concepts of human rights and human
security).
5 See generally Philip A. Thomas, 9/11: USA and UK, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1193
(2003) (analyzing whether the responses to September 1 th constitute criminal justice effi-
ciency); Waldron, supra note 3; Lucia Zedner, Securing Liberty in the Face of Terror: Reflec-
tions from Criminal Justice, 32 J. L. & Soc. 507 (2005) (advocating continued use of
structural and procedural safeguards to protect the balance between security and human
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tors have suggested that balancing may not be appropriate in the realm of
civil liberties because it is consequentialist-it assumes that an increase
in the risk to security justifies a commensurate diminution in liberty.
And while one might respond to this notion by arguing that rights are at
stake on both sides of the balance since potential victims have rights too,
this argument merely raises complex philosophical questions about theo-
ries of conflicting rights-issues which the balancing discourse is ill-
equipped to deal with.6
The aim of this Essay is to add to this literature regarding the bal-
ancing discourse in two ways. Part I distinguishes two formats in which
the notion of balance is presented-the trade-off thesis, which presents
security and liberty as competing values so that more of one necessarily
means less of the other, and the metaphorical image of a set of scales,
where one pan represents security and the other represents liberty. Part I
explains why it is important these different presentations of the notion of
balance are distinguished and shows why each is inadequate as a tool for
analyzing anti-terrorism policy. Part II argues that the analytical
frameworks presented by both the trade-off thesis and the image of a set
of scales are too narrow in their scope. This obscures an understanding
of, and hinders engagement with, issues that are of fundamental impor-
tance in contemporary anti-terrorism policy.
I. THE TRADE-OFF THESIS AND THE IMAGE OF A SET OF SCALES
In his book Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of Na-
tional Emergency, Judge Richard Posner claims that following 9/11 the
relative weights of security and liberty changed, resulting in a "dise-
quilibrium in the existing system of constitutional rights."'7 Posner states
that the appropriate response in such circumstances is to "restrike the
balance" between security and liberty by calibrating the scope of those
rights which could be asserted against government measures for protect-
ing national security. 8 In any particular case, this is done by locating
"the point at which a slight expansion in the scope of the right would
subtract more from public safety than it would add to personal liberty
rights); Ronald Dworkin, Terror & the Attack on Civil Liberties, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 6,
2003, at 37; Ronald Dworkin, The Threat to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002,
at 44.
6 See Waldron, supra note 3; see also Anastassia Tsoukala, Democracy in the Light of
Security: British and French Political Discourses on Domestic Counter-Terrorism Policies, 54
POL. STUD. 607 (2006) (similarly arguing that since both security and liberty can be couched in
terms of freedoms, insisting on the primacy of democratic freedoms does not advance the civil
libertarian cause).
7 RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NA-
TIONAL EMERGENCY 147 (2006).
8 See id. at 31.
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and a slight contraction would subtract more from personal liberty than it
would add to public safety."9 This, Posner states, is the "point of bal-
ance." 0 The image which he uses to depict this suggestion is a set of
scales." One pan of the scales contains liberty and the other contains
security.' 2 As the weights of the respective interests change, the balance
needs and receives readjustment.' 3
The problem with Posner's use of this imagery, however, is its dis-
parity with his description of how to locate the point of balance. Accord-
ing to the description, in order to resolve an imbalance in favor of liberty,
it is necessary to sacrifice some liberty for an increase in security (and
vice versa). In other words, the description assumes a trade-off between
security and liberty-what one commentator has described as "a hydrau-
lic relationship between human rights safeguards and the promotion of
security, that is that as one goes up the other must go down."' 4 This does
not tally with the imagery Posner uses because the metaphor of a set of
scales does not assume a trade-off between security and liberty. It is
possible to add to or subtract from the contents of one pan in a set of
scales without altering the contents of the other pan. This means that
where the two pans are imbalanced, it is unnecessary to add to one pan
and subtract from the other in order to redress the imbalance.
For example, suppose one unit of either security or liberty confers
one unit of welfare. Prior to 9/11, one pan of the metaphorical scales
contained twelve units of security and the other contained twelve units of
liberty. So there was a balance-the security and liberty pans conferred
an equal quantity (twelve units) of welfare. Following 9/11, the weight
attached to security increased, so that now one unit of security only con-
fers 0.5 units of welfare.' 5 Since the twelve units of security now only
confer six units of welfare, there is an imbalance in favor of liberty.' 6
One possible way to redress this would be the method envisaged by Pos-
ner-to trade off some liberty for increased security. If four units of
liberty were traded off for four units of security, the result would be
equal quantities of welfare (eight units of liberty equals eight units of
welfare, as does sixteen units of security).
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 See id. at 148.
12 See id.
13 Id.
14 Andrew Ashworth, Security, Terrorism and the Value of Human Rights, in SucuR'n'
AND HUMAN RIGrrs 203, 208 (Benjamin J. Goold & Liora Lazarus eds., 2007).
15 Since the value attached to security has increased, more units of security are required
to attain the same level of welfare.
16 The attacks of 9/11 did not change our level of security overnight, though it did
change our perception of our level of security.
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But a balance could be achieved in other ways. One approach
would be to increase the number of units of security without altering the
number of units of liberty. In our example, it is possible to restrike a
balance by adding twelve units to the security pan while leaving the
number of units of liberty unchanged, since both sides of the scales
would then confer twelve units of welfare. Alternatively, instead of a
trade-off, a balance could be achieved by changing the number of units
of both security and liberty in the same direction. Simultaneously in-
creasing the number of units of security by sixteen to twenty-eight and
increasing the number of units of liberty by two to fourteen would strike
a balance, since both sides of the scales would then confer fourteen units
of welfare. Thus, there is a disparity between Posner's description of
how to restrike a balance, which implies the necessity of trading off lib-
erty for security (and vice versa), and the image he uses to illustrate this.
In short, his metaphorical scales are inadequate to convey his position.
Therefore, this portion of the Essay considers these two aspects of
Posner's work separately. The first part considers his description of how
to balance security and liberty-the trade-off thesis. It argues that the
assumption of security and liberty existing in an inverse hydraulic rela-
tionship is unduly simplistic, and consequently obscures discussion of
anti-terrorism policy. The second part focuses on the image of a set of
scales. Since this metaphor does not rest on the assumption of an inverse
hydraulic relationship-adding to or subtracting from one pan of a set of
scales does not affect the contents of the other pan-the second part con-
siders whether the metaphor might be a useful tool for analyzing anti-
terrorism policy.
A. The Trade-Off Thesis
In their book, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty, and the
Courts,17 Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule also advance the thesis that
there is a trade-off between security and liberty. 18 Using the welfare
economics concept of a Pareto frontier-a frontier which identifies a
range of points at which no win-win improvements are possible-they
claim that there is a "security-liberty frontier."'19 At this frontier "any
increase in security will require a decrease in liberty, and vice versa. The
problem from the social point of view is one of optimization: to choose
the point along the frontier that maximizes the joint benefits of security
and liberty." 20 Following an event like 9/11, the value placed on security
17 Emc A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY,
AND THE COURTS (2007).
18 Id. at 21.
19 Id. at 26-28.
20 Id. at 26-27.
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increases, so "a rational and well-motivated government will then trade
off some losses in liberty for greater gains in increased security. '21
The trade-off thesis which Posner describes and which Posner and
Vermeule advance rests on two suppositions. The first is that an anti-
terrorism measure affecting either security or liberty will also affect the
other. Posner and Vermeule defend this supposition by stating that,
while "[i]n some situations, rational policymakers can increase security
at no cost to liberty, or increase liberty at no cost to security," it is "plau-
sible to assume that advanced liberal democracies rarely overlook such
opportunities. '22
Practical examples suggest, however, that it is unjustifiably optimis-
tic to assume that governments seize almost all opportunities to increase
security in ways which do not diminish liberty. Port security is one ex-
ample. Benjamin and Simon have highlighted the vast number of con-
tainers that enter the U.S. every year-as many as nine million in 2004.23
Yet, ninety-five percent of these are not inspected, leading one official to
describe them as "the potential Trojan [H]orse of the 21st Century. 24
Benjamin and Simon describe the Container Security Initiative, under
which cargoes are inspected in foreign ports before they depart for the
United States, as a "superb concept," but note the lack of a "workable
plan to include ports in poor countries, from which terrorists are most
likely to ship their cargoes" and the fact that "only 597 of the 5,000
companies whose applications to the program have been accepted have
actually been checked out. '25
Other similar examples include efforts to safeguard nuclear materi-
als and materials that could be turned into biological weapons. With
respect to the latter, Benjamin and Simon agree with the statement of
Richard Falkenrath, former Deputy Homeland Security Adviser, that
"there's no area of homeland security in which the administration has
made more progress than bioterrorism and none where we have further to
go."'26 With respect to the former, they explain that "Nuclear terrorism
can be avoided . . . . The key is securing loose nuclear material, but
current efforts along this path need to be invigorated enormously, some-
21 Id. at 27.
22 Id. at 26.
23 DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
JIHAD 249 (2005).
24 Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner, Customs and Border Protection, Remarks before
the Council on Foreign Relations (Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/
newsroom/commissioner/speechesstatements/archives/2005/01112005_foreignrel.xml (last
visited Mar. 12, 2009).
25 BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 23, at 250.
26 Id. at 248.
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thing that does not look likely in the near term. '2 7 In spite of his criti-
cisms of the war on terror and his assertion that the likelihood of
terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons is very low-not least because of
the enormous practical difficulties involved in building a nuclear device
capable of producing mass destruction-John Mueller agrees that the de-
structive capacity of nuclear weapons demands that the world's supply of
fissile material be carefully controlled. 28 He also urges the importance of
protecting vulnerable targets like chemical plants.29 Pointing to the al-
leged sabotage of a chemical plant in Bhopal, India, in 1984, and the way
in which, on 9/11, existing objects were transformed into weapons, he
warns that chemical plants must be secure from "deliberate and diaboli-
cal manipulation by knowledgeable and dedicated insiders." 30
Experience also suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that govern-
ments will rarely overlook opportunities to increase liberty in situations
where doing so involves no decrease in security. For example, in De-
cember 2004, the House of Lords held that the power under Part IV of
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 200131 (ATCSA) to in-
definitely detain foreign nationals suspected of being terrorists-a power
that the British Parliament created in the aftermath of 9/11-was incom-
patible with the European Convention on Human Rights32 (ECHR). 33
While Article 15 of the ECHR gives Member States a limited right to
derogate from some of the Convention's articles during times of war or
other public emergencies threatening the life of the nation, the majority
of the Law Lords ruled in favor of quashing Parliament's derogation to
the Article 5 right to liberty. 34 Although a majority of the Law Lords
were willing to accept the existence of a public emergency threatening
the life of the nation,35 they ultimately held that the power of indefinite
27 Id. at 133; see also GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE ULTIMATE PRE-
VENTABLE CATASTROPHE 67-86 (2004).
28 JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: How POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM INDUSTRY IN-
FLATE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM 15-17 (2006).
29 See id. at 20.
30 Id.
31 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (U.K.).
32 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Novem-
ber 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
33 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
34 Of the nine Law Lords, only Lord Walker upheld the Human Rights Act 1998 (Desig-
nated Derogation) Order 2001 (Statutory Instrument 2001/3644). Id. 194, at 85.
35 Lord Hoffman alone held that there was no public emergency threatening the life of
the nation. Id. 96, at 52. On this issue, Lords Bingham, Scott, and Rodger confessed to
"misgiving," "very great doubt," and "hesitation" as to whether there was a public emergency
threatening the life of the nation. Id. 1 26, at 16, 154, at 70-71, 165, at 74-75. However,
because it was principally a matter of political judgment, and because the European Court of
Human Rights has afforded national authorities a very wide margin of appreciation on this
issue, the Law Lords chose to accept that such a state existed. Id. 118, at 58-59. By con-
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detention failed to satisfy the Article 15 requirement that Member States
only derogate from the Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation. Their conclusion stemmed from the fact that
British authorities did not use indefinite detention without trial to deal
with the threat British nationals suspected of involvement in international
terrorism posed. Their Lordships thus concluded that quashing the dero-
gation order and vindicating the detainees' Article 5 right to liberty
would not jeopardize the nation's security. As Baroness Hale pithily re-
marked, "If it is not necessary to lock up the nationals it cannot be neces-
sary to lock up the foreigners." 36
This example, which describes a situation where a government
failed to take steps to increase liberty-specifically, the liberty of foreign
nationals suspected of being terrorists-even though doing so would not
have involved any cost in terms of diminished security, provides an an-
swer to Posner and Vermeule's question, "Why exactly would govern-
ment adopt a policy, from among the alternatives, that places
unnecessary restrictions on liberty?" 37 Following the House of Lords'
judgment, both the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary insisted that
their primary responsibility was to protect the nation's security, adding
that they wanted to dismiss the possibility of being accused of not doing
more to protect the public in the event of a successful terrorist attack.3 8
Based on this approach, a government would not be inclined to remove a
restriction on liberty even though the restriction does not confer any mar-
ginal increase in security if its removal would create the perception that
the government is not doing everything within its power to safeguard the
security of its citizens.
The second supposition underlying the trade-off thesis is that where
a measure does affect both security and liberty, the effect on one will be
the converse of the effect on the other. Posner and Vermeule defend this
supposition by stating that while it is theoretically possible "that there are
trast, Lord Hope stated that there was "ample evidence" to support the Government's assertion
that a public emergency threatening the life of the nation existed. Id. at 58-59; see also David
Dyzenhaus, An Unfortunate Outburst of Anglo-Saxon Parochialism, 68 M.L.R. 673-76
(2005); Tom R. Hickman, Between Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention
and the Derogation Model of Constitutionalism, 68 M.L.R. 655-68 (2005); Stephen Tierney,
Determining the State of Exception: What Role for Parliament and the Courts?, 68 M.L.R.
668-72 (2005); Adam Tomkins, Readings of A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department,
[2005] PuB. LAW 259-66 (offering additional commentary on the case).
36 A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56, T 231, at 99. The
Law Lords went on to hold that, since the power of indefinite detention only applied to foreign
suspected terrorists, the detainees' Article 14 right to be free from unjustifiable discrimination
had also been violated. Id.
37 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 17, at 33.
38 See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHrs, PREVENTION OF TERRORISM BILL,
2004-5, H.C. 334, at 6-7, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt2O4O5/jt-
select/jtrights/68/68.pdf.
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policies, other than the ones that government adopts, that would increase
both security and liberty," this is seldom the case in practice.3 9 They
claim:
Real-world examples are few and far between ... One
does not often see a coalition between the American
Civil Liberties Union and equivalent pro-security groups
to oppose government policies. The reason is probably
that most liberal democratic governments are not so dys-
functional as to adopt or retain policies that are unani-
mously opposed by groups on all sides of security
debates." 40
The difficulty with this assertion is that it fails to account for what
Posner and Vermeule label "libertarian panics"-whereby individuals
"overestimate the threat of civil liberties violations and underestimate the
security benefits of governmental policies. t41 Libertarian panics might
cause civil liberties organizations to oppose a government policy even
though the actual effect of the policy is to increase both security and
liberty. Posner and Vermeule discuss section 215 of the USA PATRIOT
Act42-a power that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) decries
as "misguided, dangerous, and unconstitutional" 43-as an example.
They argue that the power section 215 confers on courts-to order the
production of "business records in national security investigations"-
merely "codifies a power that grand juries (typically dominated by prose-
cutors) have long exercised without judicial oversight. Measured from
that baseline, as opposed to some imaginary libertarian one, the addition
of judicial subpoenas looks no worse, and possibly better, from the point
of view of targets and defendants."'44 According to Posner and
39 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 17, at 26.
40 Id. at 33.
41 Id. at 77; see also Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Panics, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 871, 871
(2005).
42 The Uniting and Strengthening of America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001).
43 ANN BEESON & JAMEEL JAFFER, Am. CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, UNPATRIOTIC ACTS:
THE FBI's POWER TO RIFLE THROUGH YOUR RECORDS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS WITHOUT
TELLING You 1 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/spies-report.pdf.
44 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 17, at 80 (emphasis added). There is a considerable
body of literature on § 215. See e.g., Susan N. Herman, The USA Patriot Act and the Sub-
majoritarian Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 67 (2006); Michael O'Donnell,
Reading for Terrorism: Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act and the Constitutional Right to
Information Privacy, 31 J. LEGIS. 45 (2004); James B. Perrine, The USA Patriot Act: Big
Brother or Business as Usual?, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 163 (2005); Chris-
topher P. Raab, Fighting Terrorism in an Electronic Age: Does the Patriot Act Unduly Com-
promise Our Civil Liberties?, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 3; Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty
and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REv. 663 (2004); Michael J. Woods, Counterintel-
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Vermeule, therefore, section 215 had the potential to not only increase
security, but also to improve the protection of liberty.
Debates over legal thresholds for exercising investigative powers
also suggest that those debating anti-terrorism policy might overlook op-
portunities to simultaneously increase both security and liberty. Consis-
tent with the trade-off thesis, such debates tend to be couched in terms of
a clash between security and liberty, with security requiring the threshold
to be loosened as much as possible, and liberty requiring the threshold to
be tightened as much as possible, where those debating anti-terrorism
policy must strike a balance between these competing demands. How-
ever, this overlooks the possibility that there may be an optimum point
beyond which further loosening of the legal threshold will reduce secur-
ity, not enhance it.
For example, in his review of Posner and Vermeule's book, Mark
Davies rejects the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court-
"judicial review writ small" in Posner and Vermeule's words45-as "a
possible model for judicial review in the terrorism context," arguing in-
stead that "ordinary judicial review of agency action should obtain. '46
Significantly, Davies's argument is not based on libertarian grounds;
rather, his concern is to "get the best possible performance from our se-
curity agencies."'47
Davies uses the case of Brandon Mayfield as an example, arguing
that "if we are seeking a model of judicial review that advances security,
there is little reason to think that the FISA Court, at least as currently set
up, advances that goal."' 48 The FISA Court authorized electronic surveil-
lance of Mayfield following the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March
2004, only for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to admit two
weeks later that no real evidence linked Mayfield to the bombings. 49
The Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General conducted a
review of the case, which "found, at bottom, a lack of FBI rigor."' 50 Sim-
ilarly, Stephen Schulhofer has expressed concern about the expansion of
government surveillance powers post-9/1 1.51 He argues that more rigor-
ligence and Access to Transactional Records: A Practical History of USA PATRIOT Act Sec-
tion 215, 1 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 37 (2005).
45 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 17, at 208.
46 Mark S. Davies, "Quotidian" Judges vs. AI-Qaeda, 105 Micn. L. REV. 1107, 1111-12
(2007).
47 Id. at 1111.
48 Id. at 1112.
49 See id. at 1111.
50 Id.
51 Stephen J. Schulhofer, At War With Liberty, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Mar. 1, 2003, at 1,
available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=at war-with-liberty (last visited Mar.
12, 2009).
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ous accountability measures "need not impair the usefulness of the new
powers but, if well designed, would actually enhance them."'52
Another example stems from the wealth of information5 3 accumu-
lated following the USA PATRIOT Act's expansion of the FBI's author-
ity to obtain information through National Security Letters (NSLs) 54 and
the Bureau's desire to avoid criticism in the aftermath of any future ter-
rorist attack. 55 As the FBI's response, in December 2003, to intelligence
suggesting a New Year's Eve attack in Las Vegas illustrates, 56 the FBI's
current desire to avoid blame for the occurrence of a terrorist attack ap-
parently leads the Bureau to expend substantial resources on licentious
searches for information involving individuals only tenuously linked
with the subject of an investigation. Against this background, it is plau-
sible to ask whether a tighter legal threshold for the issuance of NSLs
might increase security by channeling the FBI's efforts.
B. The Image of a Set of Scales
Unlike the trade-off thesis, the image of a set of scales does not
assume an inverse hydraulic relationship between security and liberty. It
is possible to alter the contents of one pan of a set of scales without
changing the contents of the other pan. This raises the question whether
this image might be a useful aid for analyzing anti-terrorism policy.
Posner states that the change in the relative weights of security and
liberty following 9/11 resulted in a disequilibrium, and that the task in
such a situation is to restrike the balance.57 So in terms of his metaphor
of a set of scales, prior to 9/11, the pans of the scales were balanced, and
the attacks of that day threw this out of kilter by changing the weight
attached to security relative to liberty. The challenge afterwards was to
return the pans to a level balance. If this is the objective, it follows that
52 Id. at 2.
53 The Justice Department's Office of the Inspector General conducted a review of the
FBI's use of National Security Letters (NSLs), which found that the FBI issued approximately
8,500 NSL requests in 2000-the year prior to the introduction of the USA PATRIOT Act-
compared to 39,000 in 2003, 56,000 in 2004, and 47,000 in 2005. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR
GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S RE-
VIEW OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS 37 (2007).
54 See The Uniting and Strengthening of America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
§ 505, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see also USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 115-118, 120 Stat. 192 (2005) (including an explicit provi-
sion that a NSL may be judicially reviewed and that the recipient of a NSL may disclose
receipt to those to whom such disclosure is necessary to comply with the request and/or to an
attorney in order to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect to the request).
55 Barton Gellman, The FBI's Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at Al.
56 Id. (describing efforts by the FBI to gather guest lists from Las Vegas casinos using
NSLs).
57 See POSNER, supra note 7, at 31.
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even if a measure would not succeed in restriking a level balance, the
measure should nonetheless be enacted if its effect would be to reduce
the imbalance between the security and liberty pans.
Where a set of scales is imbalanced, the magnitude of the imbalance
is determined by how the total quantity of weight is distributed between
the two pans of the scales-in other words, by the relative weight of each
pan. Thus, in order to determine whether or not a change to the number
of units of security and/or liberty will reduce the imbalance between the
two pans, it is necessary to calculate what proportion of the total quantity
of welfare derives from each pan. To return to our previous example,
where the twelve units of security in one pan of the scales confer six
units of welfare and the twelve units of liberty in the other pan confer
twelve units of welfare, there is an imbalance of one-third (there is a total
of eighteen units of welfare; two-thirds of these derive from the liberty
pan and only one-third from the security pan). This is thus a greater
imbalance than where there are twenty-four units of security in one pan
of the scales (equaling twelve units of welfare) and eighteen units of
liberty in the other pan (equaling eighteen units of welfare). Although
the numerical difference between the number of units of welfare con-
ferred by each pan is the same in each example (six), in the latter exam-
ple there is only an imbalance of one-fifth (of the thirty total number of
units of welfare, three-fifths derive from the liberty pan and two-fifths
derive from the security pan).
Since the image of a set of scales makes no assumption of an in-
verse hydraulic relationship, it follows that the image envisages an anti-
terrorism measure having one of nine different effects on security and
liberty. Each of these will be considered in turn:
1. No Effect on Either Security or Liberty
According to the image of a set of scales, since a mea-
sure which has no effect on either security or liberty will
do nothing to redress the existing imbalance, there is no
reason why it should be enacted.
2. No Effect on Liberty; An Increase in Security
The image of a set of scales would support the enact-
ment of a measure which increases the number of units
in the security pan while leaving the number of units in
the liberty pan unchanged, provided that the increase in
the number of units in the security pan is not so great as
to result in an imbalance in favor of security that is equal
to, or even greater than, the initial imbalance in favor of
liberty.
3. No Effect on Liberty; A Decrease in Security
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The image of a set of scales tells us that since a measure
which diminishes the number of units in the security pan
and has no effect on the number of units in the liberty
pan will result in an even greater imbalance in favor of
liberty, the particular measure should not be enacted.
4. No Effect on Security; An Increase in Liberty
According to the image of a set of scales, a measure
which increases the number of units in the liberty pan
and has no effect on the number of units in the security
pan should not be enacted since the measure would
merely result in an even greater imbalance in favor of
liberty.
5. No Effect on Security; A Decrease in Liberty
The image of a set of scales would support the enact-
ment of a measure which diminishes the number of units
in the liberty pan while leaving the number of units in
the security pan unchanged since the measure would re-
duce the imbalance in favor of liberty-provided that the
decrease in the number of units in the liberty pan is not
so great as to result in an imbalance in favor of security
that is equal to, or even greater than, the initial imbal-
ance in favor of liberty.
6. An Increase in Both Security and Liberty
Whether or not the image of a set of scales supports the
enactment of a measure which will increase the number
of units in both the security and liberty pans will depend
on the extent of these increases. Using our previous ex-
ample, if the number of units in the liberty pan is in-
creased from twelve to twenty-one (so that this pan
confers twenty-one units of welfare) and the number of
units in the security pan is increased from twelve to four-
teen (so that this pan confers seven units of welfare), the
result will be an even greater imbalance in favor of lib-
erty (three-quarters of the units of welfare will derive
from the liberty pan and one-quarter from the security
pan, giving an imbalance of one-half compared to one-
third initially). Similarly, an even greater imbalance
(this time in favor of security) will result if the effect of
the measure is to add sixty-six units to the security pan
and one unit to the liberty pan (three-quarters of the total
units of welfare will derive from the security pan, giving
an imbalance of one-half). Thus, the image supports the
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enactment of a measure which will increase the number
of units in the security and liberty pans provided that the
effect of the increases is to reduce the initial imbalance.
7. A Decrease in Both Security and Liberty
Removing units from both pans of the scales could have
the effect of reducing the initial imbalance. In our previ-
ous example, reducing the number of units in the liberty
pan from twelve to six and the number of units in the
security pan from twelve to eight would reduce the im-
balance to one-fifth (of the total of ten units of welfare,
six would derive from the liberty pan). Provided that the
effect of the measure is to decrease the initial imbalance,
the image of a set of scales would support its enactment.
8. An Increase in Security; A Decrease in Liberty
Increasing the number of units in the security pan of the
scales while simultaneously reducing the number in the
liberty pan will reduce the imbalance in favor of liberty.
The image thus supports the enactment of a measure
which will have this effect, provided that it will not re-
sult in an equal, or even greater, imbalance in favor of
security.
9. An Increase in Liberty; A Decrease in Security
Decreasing the number of units in the security pan while
simultaneously increasing the number in the liberty pan
will inevitably result in a greater imbalance than ini-
tially. So according to the image of a set of scales, a
measure which will have this effect should not be
enacted.
A purview of these nine different scenarios demonstrates that the
image of a set of scales has no value as an analytical aid. The demands
of security and liberty do not compete in any of the first seven scenarios,
and so it is possible to resolve them using common sense. In these sce-
narios, the rational objective is to maximize the total quantity of security
and liberty. But because of its fixation with achieving a level balance,
the image of a set of scales only arrives at the common sense conclusion
in two of the seven scenarios. What the image tells us in these two sce-
narios is that there is no reason to enact an anti-terrorism measure which
has no effect on either security or liberty (Scenario 1), and that a measure
which reduces security and has no effect on liberty should not be enacted
(Scenario 3). These are both negative conclusions, in that they merely
tell us something we should not do, and in any event an analytical aid is
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hardly needed to arrive at them. In the other five of the first seven scena-
rios, the metaphor arrives at the perverse conclusion that a measure
which will increase liberty without having any effect on security should
not be enacted (Scenario 4). Furthermore, the metaphor countenances
the enactment of those measures which will decrease liberty without any
impact on security (Scenario 5) and decrease both security and liberty
(Scenario 7), and it provides only conditional support for those measures
which will increase security without any impact on liberty (Scenario 2)
and increase both security and liberty (Scenario 6).
Of the nine scenarios, it is the last two which involve difficult as-
sessments. Here, one would expect some assistance from an analytical
aid. Yet in one of the scenarios (Scenario 9), the metaphor cursorily
dismisses the enactment of the measure without inviting any further con-
sideration of the increase in liberty and concomitant decrease in security.
It might be that the increase in liberty is substantial and certain and the
decrease in security is slight and speculative. As for the other scenario
(Scenario 8), the metaphor offers no guidance on how to assess whether
the increase in security justifies the diminution in liberty. It merely is-
sues the trite warning not to create an even greater imbalance in favor of
security.
So even if it is possible to quantify security and liberty in the man-
ner envisaged by the image of a set of scales, 58 the image is of no value
as an analytical aid. Applying the metaphor merely produces statements
of the obvious, perverse conclusions, and a dearth of useful guidance
when difficult assessments need to be made.
II. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE BALANCING DISCOURSE
Having used the assumption of an inverse hydraulic relationship to
distinguish between the trade-off thesis and the image of a set of scales,
and shown the flaws inherent in each, this Essay proceeds to identify
three respects in which both these presentations of the balancing dis-
course are too narrow in scope. First, these presentations simply refer to
increases and decreases in liberty and security without initially assessing
the effect that a particular measure will have on security and liberty.
Second, they exclude any scope for consideration of issues relating to
resource allocation. And third, they focus on only one particular strategy
for increasing welfare.
A. Assessing a Measure's Effect on Security and Liberty
Although they refer to increases and decreases in security, the trade-
off thesis and the image of a set of scales exclude any scope for consider-
58 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 17, at 28.
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ing the effect of a particular measure on security.5 9 This is significant,
since a measure which might improve security in some respects could
also harm security in others. For example, one of the concerns that have
been expressed about the proliferation of electronic surveillance is that it
hampers efforts to obtain human intelligence. Maureen Webb argues
that "the global surveillance dragnet alienates the very communities from
whom intelligence agencies currently need assistance, making it difficult
to get crucial tips from them and difficult to recruit the law-enforcement
and intelligence officers needed from their ranks."'60 A similar concern,
which was repeated on numerous occasions during the Parliamentary de-
bates on the Prevention of Terrorism Bill (now Act 2005)-the legisla-
tion which set in place the Control Orders regime to replace the power of
indefinite detention of foreign suspected terrorists-is that laws which
are perceived as unjust might produce resentment and generate more ter-
rorists.6' During the debates, for example, the shadow Home Secretary
warned:
If, however, the Government insists on rushing these
measures through, I fear that they may do the opposite of
what they want. They will create a sense of injustice
among many British citizens, and do what I warned
when we first discussed this: for every known terrorist
that the Home Secretary confines, he may create 10 un-
known terrorists, free to do harm to our people and to
our nation. 62
Suppose an anti-terrorism measure will in one respect increase se-
curity by X, but a corollary of the measure will reduce security in another
respect by Y. When the trade-off thesis and the metaphorical scales refer
to exchanging an increase in security for a reduction in liberty, it is un-
clear whether the projected increase in security refers to the simple in-
crease produced by the measure (X), or the measure's net effect (X
minus Y). If the reference is the former, this raises the question of where
exactly the expected security loss (Y) falls to be considered. Since the
59 It also does not make clear whether security is to be taken in the objective or subjec-
tive sense. This Essay assumes that in this context security should be taken in the objective
sense. For a defense of this position, see Stuart Macdonald, Why We Should Abandon the
Balance Metaphor: A New Approach to Counterterrorism Policy, 15 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 95-146 (2008).
60 MAUREEN WEBB, ILLUSIONS OF SECURITY: GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY
IN THE POST-9/l 1 WORLD 240 (2007).
61 431 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 158, available at www.publications.parlia-
ment.uk/pa/cm200405/cmhansrd/vo050222/debtext/50222-06.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
62 Id.; see also Colm Campbell & Ita Connolly, Making War on Terror? Global Lessons
from Northern Ireland, 69 M.L.R. 935, 936 (2006) ("There is a well established 'social move-
ment' literature . . . suggesting that the state's response ... may function as a stimulus to the
mobilisation of its violent challengers.").
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balancing discourse only refers to a reduction in liberty, the discourse
seems (on this interpretation) to exclude consideration of any collateral
security losses. If the reference is the latter, it needs to be made plain
that the net effect of the measure on security should be assessed before
issues pertaining to liberty are even considered. There is no sense in
diminishing liberty in exchange for a measure whose net effect will also
be to reduce security.
The trade-off thesis and image of a set of scales also fail to consider
the effect a measure will have on liberty. Such a framework is necessary
since different individuals hold widely diverging views on what the dic-
tates of liberty require and how these demands should be met. Imagine
an example involving a proposal to introduce a new investigative power
(Power A) and a procedural safeguard (Safeguard B), which some claim
is needed to regulate how Power A is used.
There may be different opinions on at least three issues. 63 First,
there may be different views on whether Power A is one which should
ever be vested in the state. One person might believe that it would be
morally indefensible to ever introduce the use of the power, and so
would oppose introducing the power regardless of the projected security
gains, while another might regard the power as a regrettable but neces-
sary evil, and so would be willing to countenance the incursion on liberty
in exchange for a significant increase in security. Second, there may be
different views on the effect Power A will actually have on liberty. One
person might believe that the power involves a grave incursion on lib-
erty, whereas another might believe that the power involves no sacrifice
of liberty since its level of intrusiveness is de minimis. Third, there may
be different views on whether Safeguard B is necessary to prevent Power
A from being abused. The person who believes Safeguard B is necessary
to regulate the use of Power A will believe that non-implementation of
the safeguard involves a sacrifice of liberty, whereas the person who be-
lieves Safeguard B is unnecessary to regulate the use of Power A will
not.
Before asserting whether a particular measure will increase or de-
crease liberty, it is important to engage with the variety of different per-
spectives held by those debating anti-terrorism policy. The trade-off
thesis and metaphorical scales are insensitive to the fact that many dis-
agreements stem not from different views on whether a reduction in lib-
erty should be accepted in exchange for an increase in security, but from
whether the measure in question involves a reduction in liberty at all.
63 See Macdonald, supra note 59.
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B. Resource Allocation
According to the balancing discourse, the value attached to security
increases following an event like 9/11. Thus, in order to optimize social
welfare, the government will diminish some liberty in exchange for
greater gains in security. This framework discounts the possibility that
by increasing spending on anti-terrorism measures, security could be en-
hanced without any sacrifice of liberty.
Posner and Vermeule note how "civil libertarians suggest that.
government can increase security, without any reduction in liberty, sim-
ply by increasing funding for security measures."'64 They reject this sug-
gestion, saying that it "makes things too easy by supposing that free
lunches can be had." 65 Instead they assume a "budget constraint," i.e.,
that the security-liberty frontier cannot simply be pushed farther out by
increased government spending.66 What this overlooks, however, is that
as well as impacting the weight attached to security relative to liberty,
changes in circumstances over time will also affect: (1) the weight at-
tached to governmental efforts to safeguard our security relative to other
forms of government spending and activity, and (2) the weight attached
to governmental efforts to safeguard our security against terrorism rela-
tive to efforts to safeguard us against other threats to our security.
As greater weight is placed on security in general, and on security
against terrorism in particular, a reallocation of resources is to be ex-
pected. Indeed, by early 2006, the Bush administration claimed that
since 2001, it had more than tripled spending devoted to non-defense
homeland security.67 To assume that budgetary constraints will preclude
the security-liberty frontier being pushed farther out is too insular, for it
ignores the likelihood that the change in circumstances which led to the
increase in the weight of security relative to liberty will also have caused
the government to reallocate its limited resources.
Posner and Vermeule are right, though, to say that increasing spend-
ing on anti-terrorism measures is not a free lunch. Diverting resources
carries with it an opportunity cost. For example, although the FBI's
budget has increased since 9/11, this increase has been insufficient to pay
for all the anti-terrorism work it is now required to do. 68 As a result,
funds have had to be shifted from its other programs, such as crime-
fighting. 69 Sixty-seven percent of FBI agents working on criminal inves-
64 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 17, at 35.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2007 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/budget/fy2007/dhs.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2009).
68 MUELLER, supra note 28, at 32.
69 Id.
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tigations were reassigned to anti-terrorism work, and some police chiefs
attributed the rise in the rate of violent crime in 2005 in part to the pres-
sure to divert resources and personnel to antiterrorism efforts. 70 Moreo-
ver, inept governmental measures to deal with the results of Hurricane
Katrina in 2005 may have been partly attributable to the relatively small
sum made available in grants to improve preparedness for natural disas-
ters compared to terrorism.71 Similarly, commentators have suggested
that the Federal Emergency Management Agency's failed performance in
New Orleans was the result of its assimilation within the Department of
Homeland security, which "reduced [FEMA's] preparedness by pushing
it away from a focus on natural disasters towards postures more appro-
priate for a civil defense role in the War on Terror."'72 And while in
February 2006, the President's 2007 fiscal year budget increased the
funding allocated to the Departments of Homeland Security (by some-
where between five and seven percent) and Defense (by five percent,
plus an additional $120 billion towards the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq), the budget made cuts to Medicare and a host of domestic spending
programs. 73
As these examples illustrate, when changes in circumstances cause
greater stress to be laid upon security from the terrorist threat, the gov-
ernment will reallocate resources to the anti-terrorism sphere-resources
which could have been used to combat other threats to our security, or to
finance other areas of public spending-and so it is important to consider
the opportunity cost of the resources that will be expended. Such discus-
sion is forestalled by assuming that budget constraints mean expenditure
on anti-terrorism policy cannot be increased and focusing exclusively on
a measure's impact on security and liberty.
C. Strategies for Increasing Welfare
According to the balancing discourse, the weight attached to secur-
ity increases following an event like 9/11. The increased weight attached
to security means that a greater quantity of security is needed than before
to attain the same level of welfare. So, in our example, twelve units of
security now only confer six units of welfare, whereas previously they
had conferred twelve units. The balancing discourse seeks to respond to
this change in circumstances by increasing the level of security which
individuals enjoy. Of course, this may be an entirely appropriate re-
sponse-particularly if (as argued previously) the changes which will
enhance security involve no diminution in liberty (or will even increase
70 Id.
71 See id.
72 IAN S. LUSTICK, TRAPPED IN THE WAR ON TERROR 86 (2006).
73 See id. at 22.
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liberty). But it should be recognized that this is only one form of re-
sponse. Another strategy for boosting overall levels of welfare would be
to improve the security to welfare ratio, so that a greater quantity of
welfare is derived from every unit of security enjoyed.
Official definitions of terrorism, including those found in the U.S.
Federal Criminal Code,74 the U.K. Terrorism Act 2000, 75 and U.N. Se-
curity Council Resolution 156676 recognize that one of its principal
objectives is intimidation. By instilling fear and anxiety, terrorist attacks
cause individuals to derive less welfare from the level of security that
they enjoy. Thus, seeking to quell this fear is an effective way of re-
sponding to terrorism. However, cognitive research suggests that pub-
licizing new anti-terrorism legislation is unlikely to achieve this goal.
One heuristic which people use when thinking about risks is the
"availability heuristic," i.e., "they assess the magnitude of risks by asking
whether examples can readily come to mind." 77 Given the nature of ter-
rorism and the media attention devoted to it, the availability heuristic
means that an exaggerated perception of the terrorist threat is likely fol-
lowing an attack. Publicizing new anti-terrorism legislation will merely
reinforce this perception by sustaining the attack's availability and sali-
ence.78 It will also exacerbate probability neglect.79 This is where indi-
viduals focus on the badness of an outcome without considering the fact
that it is unlikely to occur, and is something which is especially acute
following a highly emotive event like a terrorist attack. 80 Contemporary
responses to terrorist attacks also tend to be vulnerability-led, focusing
on the "what if" question and encouraging an attitude of pessimism and
dread by turning previously untroubled aspects of life into a "speculative
risk."
If public anxiety is to be assuaged, policy-makers must recognize
that "an important part of the handling of intentional risk concerns the
management of response and potential response, rather than managing
the threat itself."81 Instead of embracing the idea of society under threat,
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2007).
75 Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § l(1)(b) (U.K.).
76 S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (October 8, 2004), available at http://dac-
cessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO4/542/82/PDF/N0454282.pdf? OpenElement (last visited
Mar. 12, 2009).
"7 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 36
(2005).
78 See id. at 36-39.
79 See id. at 39-41.
80 See id.; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 121, 127-28 (2003), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/k38h7v
8724424463/fulltext.pdf.
81 FRANK FUREDI, REFUSING TO BE TERRORISED: MANAGING RISK AFTER SEPTEMBER
1 ITH, at 19 (2002), available at http://www.terrorismresearch.net/docs/gobal-futuresOl.pdf.
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which provides an opportunity for those promoting intentional risks, pol-
icy-makers should promote a resilience-led approach. Beyond this, Cass
Sunstein suggests the following:
If officials want to reduce fear, the best approach may
well be simple: Alter the public's focus. I have noted
that discussions of low-probability risks tend to heighten
public concern, even if those discussions consist largely
of reassurance. Perhaps the most effective way of reduc-
ing fear of a low probability risk is simply to discuss
something else and to let time do the rest.82
None of this is to suggest that there should not be attempts made to
increase the level of security. On the contrary, the two strategies should
prove mutually reinforcing. If security is increased, and attempted ter-
rorist attacks are pre-empted and prevented, this will facilitate efforts to
shift the public's focus and encourage resilience. The problem with the
balancing discourse is that its focus on increasing welfare by improving
security neglects the importance of increasing welfare by assuaging pub-
lic fear.
CONCLUSION
Through examining the notion of balance which tends to dominate
contemporary discussions of anti-terrorism policy, this Essay has ques-
tioned the use of imagery in complex and emotionally-charged debates.
Having considered two manifestations of the balancing discourse, we
have concluded that neither has any value as an analytical aid. The
trade-off thesis is premised on unjustified suppositions, and the image of
a set of scales offers no useful guidance and is capable of producing
perverse conclusions. While their simplicity may be attractive, these
images must be abandoned as analytical aids and a more prosaic and
complex set of issues must be addressed.
It has also become apparent that balancing the demands of security
and liberty is not the sole, or even the central, task of contemporary anti-
terrorism policy. Practical experience suggests that one priority should
be to identify ways in which security may be increased without diminish-
ing liberty (and vice versa). Thought should also be given to whether
there are contexts in which reforms may be introduced which will in-
crease both security and liberty. Such work should be complemented by
strategies aimed at assuaging the fear and anxiety which terrorists seek to
generate. This will only be achieved if resilience is encouraged and the
82 Sunstein, supra note 80, at 131.
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politics of fear is rejected. 83 And the opportunity cost of the resources
expended to combat the terrorist threat must be considered. Such re-
sources could also be used to tackle other threats to our security, or in
other areas of Governmental spending. These tasks, which are obscured
by the simplistic imagery of balancing security with liberty, are all of
fundamental importance in the formulation of anti-terrorism policy.
83 The term "politics of fear" is taken from DAVID L. ALTHEIDE, TERRORISM AND THE
POLTCS OF FEAR ix (2006) (noting that the "politics of fear" is a "decision makers' promotion
and use of audience beliefs and assumptions about danger, risk, and fear in order to achieve
certain goals").
